proposed the first sender-equivocable encryption scheme secure against chosen-ciphertext attacks (NC-CCA) and proved that NC-CCA security implies security against selective opening chosen-ciphertext attacks (SO-CCA). The NC-CCA security proof of the scheme relies on security against substitution attacks of a new primitive, the "crossauthentication code". However, the security of the cross-authentication code cannot be guaranteed when all the keys used in the code are exposed. Our key observation is that, in the NC-CCA security game, the randomness used in the generation of the challenge ciphertext is exposed to the adversary. Based on this observation, we provide a security analysis of Fehr et al.'s scheme, showing that its NC-CCA security proof is flawed. We also point out that the scheme of Fehr et al. encrypting a single-bit plaintext can be refined to achieve NC-CCA security, free of the cross-authentication code. Furthermore, we propose the notion of "strong cross-authentication code", apply it to Fehr et al.'s scheme, and show that the new version of the latter achieves NC-CCA security for multi-bit plaintexts.
Introduction
The notion of sender equivocability for a public-key encryption (PKE) scheme was formalized by Fehr et al. (2010) . It is an important tool to construct PKE schemes secure against chosen-plaintext/ciphertext selective opening attacks (SO-CPA/CCA). Sender equivocability focuses on the ability of a PKE scheme to generate some "equivocable" ciphertexts which can be efficiently opened arbitrarily. More specifically, a PKE scheme is called sender-equivocable if there is a simulator which can generate non-committing ciphertexts and 1.2. Our contribution. In this paper, we focus on NC-CCA security. First, we provide an analysis of the security proof of the FHKW scheme (Fehr et al., 2010) , and show that the proof of NC-CCA security (Fehr et al., 2010) is flawed by showing an attack. The key observation is that, in the definition of NC-CCA security, the randomness used in the generation of the challenge ciphertext C * is offered to the adversary. The adversary is able to use the randomness to forge a ciphertext and obtain useful information by querying the forged ciphertext to the decryption oracle. Assume that the plaintext consists of L bits. We present a PPT adversary who can always distinguish the real experiment and the simulated experiment for L > 1. We also show that the security requirement of "L-cross-authentication codes" is not enough for the NC-CCA security proof in the work of Fehr et al. (2010) for any positive integer L.
Second, we refine the FHKW scheme encrypting one bit. Although we showed that "L-cross-authentication codes" are generally not sufficient to prove NC-CCA security, some specific instances of "1-cross-authentication codes" are helpful to finish the proof of NC-CCA security of the FHKW scheme (Fehr et al., 2010) , but limited to encryption of a single bit. We provide a simpler encryption scheme for single-bit plaintexts, free of any cross-authentication code.
Third, we fix the security proof of the FHKW scheme by introducing the strong notion of an L-cross-authentication code and using it to construct the FHKW scheme instead of the original one. Informally, a strong L-cross-authentication code requires the existence of a PPT algorithm to generate another key indistinguishable from the original one.
With this property, the randomness in the simulated experiment is different but indistinguishable from that in the real experiment, which helps the L-cross-authentication code's security against substitution attacks work again.
Organization. We start with the notation and definitions in Section 2. We recall the FHKW scheme in Section 3, and then provide its security analysis in Section 4. We present a refined version of the FHKW scheme for single-bit plaintexts in Section 5 and leave the proof 417 for Appendices. We introduce the notion of a strong cross-authentication code in Section 6, and use it to fix the security proof in Section 7. Finally, we give a summary of our work in Section 8.
Preliminaries
2.1. Notation. Let N denote the set of natural numbers. We use k ∈ N as the security parameter throughout the paper. For n ∈ N, let [n] denote the set {1, 2, . . . , n} and {0, 1} n the set of bitstrings of length n. For a finite set S, let s ← S denote the process of sampling s uniformly at random from S. If A is a probabilistic algorithm, we denote by R A the randomness set of A. Let y ← A(x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x t ) denote the process of running A on inputs {x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x t } and inner randomness R ← R A , and outputting y. If the running time of probabilistic algorithm A is polynomial in k, then A is a probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) algorithm.
Sender-equivocable encryption schemes.
The notion of sender equivocability was formalized by Fehr et al. (2010) . For a public-key encryption scheme Π = (Gen, Enc, Dec), let A = (A 1 , A 2 ) denote a stateful adversary, S = (S 1 , S 2 ) denote a stateful simulator, and M denote a plaintext. Let state denote some state information output by A 1 and then passed to A 2 . Sender equivocability under adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks is defined through the following two experiments. 
Experiment Exp

NC-CCA-Real
(M, C, R, state).
In both experiments, A = (A 1 , A 2 ) is allowed to access a decryption oracle Dec sk (·) with the constraint that A 2 is not allowed to query C.
The advantage of adversary A is defined as follows:
Definition 1.
A public-key encryption scheme Π = (Gen, Enc, Dec) is said to be sender-equivocable under adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks (NC-CCA secure) if there is a stateful PPT algorithm S (the simulator), such that for any PPT algorithm A (the adversary) the advantage Adv
2.3. Building blocks of the FHKW scheme. Fehr et al. (2010) presented a construction of PKE with NC-CCA security. We will call their scheme FHKW. It was built using the following cryptographic primitives: a collision-resistant hash function, a subset membership problem, an extended version of the hash proof system (Cramer and Shoup, 2002) , and a cross-authentication code (Fehr et al., 2010) .
Definition 2.
A family of collision-resistant hash functions H : D → R consists of two PPT algorithms (HGen, HEval).
Algorithm HGen(1 k ) randomly chooses a hash function from the family and outputs the description of the hash function H. Algorithm HEval(H, x) produces the hash value H(x) for all x ∈ D. Furthermore, for any PPT algorithm A, the following function is negligible in k:
Here we do not distinguish a function H from its description output by HGen.
Definition 3.
A subset membership problem consists of the following PPT algorithms:
SmpGen outputs a parameter Λ, which specifies a set X Λ and its subset L Λ ⊆ X Λ . Set X Λ is required to be easily recognizable with Λ.
•
Definition 4.
A subset membership problem SMP has the property of subset sparseness if the probability
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Definition 5.
A hash proof system HPS for a subset membership problem SMP associates each Λ ← SmpGen(1 k ) with an efficiently recognizable key space K Λ and the following PPT algorithms:
• HashGen(Λ): On input Λ, HashGen outputs a public key hpk and a secret key hsk, both containing the parameter Λ.
• SecEvl(hsk, X): It is a deterministic algorithm. On input a secret key hsk and an element X ∈ X Λ , SecEvl outputs a key K ∈ K Λ .
• PubEvl(hpk, X, W ): It is a deterministic algorithm. On input a public key hpk, an element X ∈ X Λ and a witness W for X ∈ L Λ , PubEvl outputs a key K ∈ K Λ . The correctness requires that
An extended hash proof system EHPS is a variation of a hash proof system HPS, extending the sets X Λ and L Λ by taking the Cartesian product of these sets with an efficiently recognizable tag space T Λ . Hence, the tuple of the three algorithms (HashGen, SecEvl, PubEvl) of
The public key hpk in a hash proof system HPS uniquely determines the action of algorithm SecEvl for all X ∈ L Λ . However, the action of SecEvl for X ∈ X Λ \ L Λ is still undetermined by hpk. This is defined by a perfectly 2-universal property.
Definition 6. A hash proof system HPS for SMP is perfectly 2-universal if, for any
where the probability is taken over all possible hsk with (hpk, hsk) ← HashGen(Λ).
Definition 7.
A domain D is efficiently samplable and explainable if there exists two PPT algorithms:
• Sample(D; R): On input a random coin R ← R Sample and a domain D, it outputs an element uniformly distributed over D.
• Explain(D, x): On input D and x ∈ D, this algorithm outputs R that is uniformly distributed over the set {R ∈ R Sample | Sample(D; R) = x}. Definition 8. (Fehr et al., 2010) For any L ∈ N, an L-cross-authentication code XAC, associated with a key space X K and a tag space X T , consists of three PPT algorithms (XGen, XAuth, XVer). Algorithm XGen(1 k ) generates a uniformly random key K ∈ X K, XAuth(K 1 , . . . , K L ) produces a tag T ∈ XT , and XVer(K, i, T ) outputs b ∈ {0, 1}. The following properties are required.
Correctness. The function
is negligible in k, where the maximum is over all i ∈ [L] and the probability is taken over all possible
Security against impersonation and substitution attacks. The advantages Adv imp XAC (k) and Adv sub XAC (k), defined as follows, are both negligible:
where the maximum is over all i ∈ [L] and T ∈ X T .
L−1 and all possibly randomized functions Func : X T → X T .
Review of the FHKW scheme
With the above cryptographic primitives, we now present the FHKW scheme (Fehr et al., 2010) .
Let SMP be a hard subset membership problem that has the property of subset sparseness. Let X Λ , with Λ ← SmpGen(1 k ), be efficiently samplable and explainable. Let EHPS be a perfectly 2-universal extended hash proof system for SMP with tag space T Λ and key space (range) K Λ , which is efficiently samplable and explainable as well. Let H : (X Λ ) L → T Λ be a family of collision-resistant hash functions, and XAC be an L-cross-authentication code with key space X K = K Λ and tag space X T . H, and outputs (pk, sk) , where pk = (hpk, H) and sk = (hsk, H).
FHKW scheme:
Sender-equivocable encryption schemes secure against chosen-ciphertext attacks revisited
L under a public key pk = (hpk, H) with randomness
Algorithm Enc runs as follows:
, set the keys
The correctness of the FHKW scheme is proved by Fehr et al. (2010) , and omitted here.
Security analysis of the FHKW scheme
According to the definition of NC-CCA security, the FHKW scheme is NC-CCA secure, if and only if there exists a simulator S such that for any PPT algorithm A, the two experiments Exp
and Exp
In order to prove NC-CCA security of the FHKW scheme, Fehr et al. (2010) constructed the following simulator S = (S 1 , S 2 ).
Simulator S:
With the simulator S, Fehr et al. (2010) proved that the FHKW scheme is NC-CCA secure. However, we will show that this specific simulator S does not guarantee NC-CCA security of the FHKW scheme for any positive integer L.
4.1.
Security proof problem. To prove NC-CCA security, it is essential to show that the decryption oracle will not leak any useful information to any PPT adversary. As to the FHKW scheme, given a challenge ciphertext C = (X 1 , . . . , X L , T ), an adversary A comes up with a decryption query C = (X 1 , . . . , X L , T ), where T = T . NC-CCA security expects the decryption of C by the oracle will not help the adversary to distinguish the two experiments Exp
(k) (see the proof of Lemma 5 in the work of Fehr et al. (2010) ). This strongly relies on the security against substitution attacks of the cross-authentication code, which requires that "given T and K =i , it is difficult to output a T = T such that XVer(K i , i, T ) = 1, where
However, in the NC-CCA game, adversary A KNOWs K i for any i ∈ [L]! The reason is as follows. Upon returning a plaintext M , adversary A receives not only a challenge ciphertext C, but also some related random coins R which are supposed to have been consumed in the challenge ciphertext generation. With R and M , adversary A can recover K i for any i ∈ [L]. Then, it is possible for A to output a T = T such that XVer(K i , i, T ) = 1. Hence, XAC's security against substitution attacks is not sufficient to guarantee the aforementioned property. That is why the security proof proposed by Fehr et al. (2010) fails (more precisely, the proof of Lemma 5 in the work of Fehr et al. (2010) does).
In fact, this kind of adversary, which can output a T = T such that XVer(K i , i, T ) = 1 given T and K i for any i ∈ [L], does exist. In Section 4.2, we will present such an adversary A to destroy the security proof of the FHKW scheme for L > 1. Deniable scheme. Gao et al. (2012) utilized exactly the same technique as that in the FHKW scheme to construct a deniable encryption scheme and "proved" the CCA security. A similar problem we pointed out above also exists in their security proof (more specifically, the proof of Claim 1 in the work of Gao et al. (2012) ). As a result,
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our attack in Section 4.2 applies to their scheme and ruins their proof, too.
Security analysis of the FHKW scheme: L > 1.
Before going into a formal statement and its proof, we briefly give a high-level description of our security analysis for L > 1.
With the aforementioned simulator S, for any L > 1, our aim is to construct an adversary A = (A 1 , A 2 ) to distinguish the two experiments Exp
The construction of adversary A is as follows.
In an experiment environment (either Exp
, A 2 will output b = 1, and otherwise, A 2 will output b = 0. Now, we consider the probabilities that A outputs 1 in the two experiments. In Exp
, so the subset sparseness of SMP and the perfect 2-universality of
Due to the security of XAC, the decryption oracle returns M = (0, 0, . . . , 0) for the queried ciphertext C . Consequently, A outputs b = 1 with an overwhelming probability in Exp
On the other hand, in Exp
Due to the correctness of XAC and the facts that
. . , L}, the decryption oracle returns M = (0, 1, . . . , 1) with an overwhelming probability. As a result, A outputs b = 1 with negligible probability in Exp 
Proof. For simplicity, we consider the case of L = 2. We note that this attack is applicable to any L > 1.
Our aim is to construct a specific adversary A = (A 1 , A 2 ) to distinguish the two experiments Exp
Specifically, given an experiment environment (either Exp
(k)), the adversary A = (A 1 , A 2 ) behaves as follows.
• Upon receiving pk = (hpk, H),
• Upon receiving a ciphertext
and randomness
-Check that T = T . If T = T , choose another random value for K 1 and repeat the above steps, until T = T .
Then A 2 submits C to the decryption oracle.
• Let M ← Dec(sk, C ). A 2 outputs b, where
Now we analyze the probabilities that A 2 outputs b = 1 in the real and the simulated experiment,
In both experiments, A 2 receives a ciphertext C = (X 1 , X 2 , T ) and randomness
The ciphertext created and submitted to the decryption oracle by
The decryption of C by the decryption oracle Dec(sk, ·) involves the computation of t := H(X 1 , X 2 ) = H(X 1 , X 2 ) = t and
Due to the perfect 2-universality of EHPS, K i is uniformly random distributed in K Λ . Hence, for i ∈ {1, 2},
(2) The probability that A 2 outputs b = 1 in the real experiment is given by Pr Exp
Simulated experiment.
The decryption of C by the decryption oracle Dec(sk, ·) involves the computation of
On the other hand, we know that
The probability that A 2 outputs b = 1 in the simulated experiment is given by Pr Exp
The advantage of adversary A is given by FHKW,A,S (k) is non-negligible (in fact, it is overwhelming), i.e., the security proof of the FHKW scheme (Fehr et al., 2010) is incorrect.
Security analysis of the FHKW scheme: L = 1.
Note that our attack in the previous section does not apply to the case L = 1. There upon receiving the ciphertext C and randomness R, the adversary A recovers K and switches the first element of K with a random one. If L = 1, A will get a new K = K 1 and then T = XAuth(K 1 ). Afterwards, A will return C = (X 1 , T ) as his decryption query. Then, A will receive M = 0 with overwhelming probability in both Exp
and Exp NC-CCA-Sim FHKW,A (k). Hence, the two experiments are still indistinguishable for A.
As we have pointed out earlier, the security of the L-cross-authentication code against substitution attacks is not sufficient for the security proof of the FHKW scheme for any value of L. But our attack above only works for L > 1. Therefore, the remaining problem is whether it is possible for the FHKW scheme to achieve NC-CCA security for L = 1, still with the aforementioned simulator S.
Before solving the problem, we claim that algorithm XAuth of XAC in the FHKW scheme is deterministic (this is not explicitly expressed in the work of Fehr et al. (2010) [L] is the only randomness used in the encryption process. In other words, if XAuth is probabilistic, the inner random number used by XAuth should be contained in the randomness R (and then passed to the adversary, according to the definition of NC-CCA security). On the other hand, if algorithm XAuth of XAC in the FHKW scheme is probabilistic, with the aforementioned simulator S, the FHKW scheme cannot be proved secure in the sense of NC-CCA for any positive integer L. (See Appendix A for the proof.)
In fact, the security proof of the FHKW scheme expected such a property from the L-cross-authentication code:
". This property generally does not hold for the L-cross-authentication code. However, it is true for some special 1-cross-authentication code, for example, the instance of an L-cross-authentication code given by Fehr et al. (2010) when constricted to L = 1. For that special instance, when L = 1, given K = K 1 and T = XAuth(K 1 ) (note that XAuth is deterministic), it is impossible to find a T = T such that XVer(K 1 , 1, T ) = 1, since only T = XAuth(K 1 ) itself could pass the verification. Therefore, with the special 1-cross-authentication code instance (or other instance with a similar property) as the ingredient, the FHKW scheme is NC-CCA secure for L = 1.
Sender-equivocable encryption scheme for a single bit
In this section, we will refine the FHKW scheme for L = 1. Specifically, we will present a PKE scheme with NC-CCA security for L = 1 without any L-cross-authentication code. Our scheme can be seen as a simplified version of the FHKW scheme instantiated with a special 1-cross-authentication code. As we have pointed earlier, the special property of a 1-cross-authentication code requires that each K determine a unique tag T satisfying XVer(K, T ) = 1. In our scheme, the encryption algorithm replaces the tag T by the key K directly. In the decryption, whether the plaintext is 1 or 0 depends on the equality of K in the ciphertext and K computed by SecEvl(hsk, X), while in the FHKW scheme the plaintext bit is determined by whether XVer(K, T ) = 1 or not.
Below we describe our scheme E = (Gen E , Enc E , Dec E ). It consists of a hard subset membership problem SMP, with subset sparseness, and its corresponding perfectly 2-universal hash proof system HPS. We require that for any Λ ← SmpGen(1 k ), both X Λ (with respect to SMP) and K Λ (with respect to HPS) be efficiently explainable. As suggested by Fehr et al. (2010) , the requirement of efficient samplability and explainability on K Λ imposes no real restriction, and it was shown in the work of Cramer and Shoup (2002) that both of the above ingredients can be constructed based on some standard number-theoretic assumptions, such as the DDH, DCR and QR assumptions.
, and outputs (pk, sk), where pk = hpk and sk = hsk.
under a public key pk = hpk with randomness
and
Correctness. On the one hand, if
Security. As for the security of scheme E, we have the following theorem. The proof is similar to that of the FHKW scheme (Fehr et al., 2010) . But the key observation is: Given C = (X, K), it is impossible to create C = (X, K ), K = K , such that K = K . Note that the security proof of our scheme does not involve any cross-authentication code. Details of the proof are in Appendix B.
Theorem 2. Assuming that SMP is a hard subset membership problem with subset sparseness, and HPS is its corresponding perfectly 2-universal hash proof system, scheme E = (Gen
E , Enc E , Dec E ) is NC-CCA secure.
Strong L-cross-authentication codes
In this section, we will introduce a strong version of L-cross-authentication codes, which will be used to construct a new version of the FHKW scheme achieving NC-CCA security. This primitive may find other cryptographic applications.
The formal definition of a strong L-cross-authentication code is as follows.
Definition 9. For L ∈ N, an L-cross-authentication code XAC is strong if there exists a PPT algorithm ReSamp satisfying the following property:
and T , and outputs K i , which is statistically indistinguishable from K i , i.e.,
) and the probabilities are taken over all possible
, and the randomness of ReSamp.
Remark 1.
Recalling the discussion in Section 4.3, algorithm XAuth is deterministic. The indistinguishability of ReSamp implies that
with overwhelming probability, where
Remark 2. The requirement that ReSamp is efficient is very important. Because this algorithm will be used to construct a simulator S in the next section, and NC-CCA security requires that the simulator should be a PPT algorithm.
Remark 3.
This "efficient resampling" property is just a missing element in the security proof of the FHKW scheme. With this particular property, the strong cross-authentication code is able to resist the attack proposed in Section 4, and fill the gap in the security proof of the FHKW scheme.
Example of a strong L-cross-authentication code.
Quite interestingly, the instance of an L-cross-authentication code XAC (Fehr et al., 2010) is also strong. Now we recall the instance XAC=(XGen,XAuth,XVer) proposed by Fehr et al. (2010) .
Let F q be a finite field, where q is determined by the security parameter k.
. Note that T can be computed efficiently by solving a linear equation system AT = B, where A ∈ F L×L q is a Vandermonde matrix and its i-th row is • XVer(K, i, T ):
and T ∈ X T , XVer outputs 1 if and only if T =⊥ and poly T (a) = b.
The code XAC has been proved to be correct and secure against impersonation and substitution attacks (Fehr et al., 2010) . Here we only show that XAC is strong as well.
Lemma 1. For any L ∈ N, the L-cross-authentication
code XAC is strong.
Proof.
A PPT algorithm ReSamp is constructed as follows. The input of ReSamp is (i, K =i , T ), where
On the other hand, conditioned on K =i and T = ⊥, the solution space of
which has identical probability distribution with K i .
Relations between the strong and the normal version of cross-authentication codes. Although the instance XAC proposed by Fehr et al. (2010) is strong, we cannot conclude that every cross-authentication code is such. On the other hand, unfortunately, we cannot provide a counterexample either, i.e., a cross-authentication code example that is not strong. Whether the strong and the normal version are equivalent is still an open question.
Fixing the security proof of the FHKW scheme with strong L-cross-authentication codes
Replacing XAC with a strong one, we get a new version of the FHKW scheme, called the new FHKW scheme. In other words, the new FHKW scheme is identical with the original one, except that its building block XAC has one more algorithm ReSamp which does not appear in neither of the two versions of the FHKW scheme. The description of the new FHKW scheme is the same as that in Section 3, so we will not repeat it again. Although algorithm ReSamp does not appear in the new FHKW scheme, it is essential for the strongness of XAC (and will be needed in the security proof). The strongness of the cross-authentication code helps its security against substitution attacks work in the security proof of the FHKW scheme (see the proof of Lemma 3). Roughly speaking, when the randomness of a ciphertext is disclosed to an adversary, all K 1 , K 2 , . . . , K L are known to the adversary. In this case, security against substitution attacks does not hold. However, if we replace the output of ReSamp(i, K =i , T ) for K i and open the corresponding randomness, the adversary can not tell the difference due to the strongness of the cross-authentication code. Consequently, security against substitution attacks works: given K =i and T , the adversary can not forge a T such that T = T and XVer(K i , i, T ) = 1 with non-negligible probability.
Details are as follows. With the help of algorithm ReSamp of strong L-cross-authentication code XAC, we construct an NC-CCA simulator S as follows.
Simulator S :
with the following method:
With the help of simulator S , we have the following result.
Theorem 3.
Let SMP be a hard subset membership problem with subset sparseness, and EHPS be its corresponding perfectly 2-universal extended hash proof system. For any L > 1, assuming that XAC is a strong L-cross-authentication code, the new FHKW scheme is NC-CCA secure.
Before going into the formal proof, we briefly give a high-level description of the following game-based security proof. This proof is similar to that proposed by Fehr et al. (2010) , but we utilize the strongness of XAC to help guarantee NC-CCA security, avoiding the problem pointed out in Section 4.
We start with the real experiment Exp NC-CCA-Real FHKW,A (k), for any PPT adversary A, and let Game −2 denote Exp NC-CCA-Real FHKW,A (k). First of all, as in the proof in the work of Fehr et al. (2010) , we exclude some collisions from Game −2 to Game 0. It is easy to see that Game −2 and Game 0 are indistinguishable. Then, from Game 0 to Game L, we stepwise replace the challenge ciphertexts
with those generated by simulator S , where Note that the differences between Game m and Game m + 1 lie in X * m+1 , K * m+1 and R * m+1 . Similar to the proof of Theorem 3 in the work of Fehr et al. (2010) , we proceed with the proof in a series of games. Let Game m.1 denote Game m. In Game m.2, we modify the decryption oracle Dec(sk, ·) such that it does not make any use of hsk, i.e., for a decryption query C, rather than verifying tag T , Dec(sk, ·) returns M i = 0 directly if X i / ∈ L Λ . Two properties, the perfect 2-universality of EHPS and the security of XAC against impersonation attacks, guarantee that Game m.2 and Game m.1 are statistically indistinguishable. Note that Game m.2 is inefficient.
The subset sparseness of SMP and the perfect 2-universality of EHPS guarantee that Game m.3 and Game m.2 are statistically indistinguishable. In Game m.4, we modify the way of computing K * m+1 again, i.e., if M *
The strongness of XAC guarantees that Game m.4 and Game m.3 are statistically indistinguishable. In Game m.5, we modify the decryption oracle Dec(sk, ·) such that it works with the original decryption rule. The perfect 2-universality of EHPS and the security of XAC against impersonation attacks and substitution attacks of XAC guarantee that Game m.5 and Game m.4 are 425 statistically indistinguishable. Note that Game m.5 is efficient. In Game m.6, we modify the way of generating X * m+1 , i.e., choose X * m+1 uniformly random from L Λ no matter whether M * m+1 is 0 or 1. The hardness of SMP guarantees that Game m.6 and Game m.5 are computationally indistinguishable. Game m.6 is identical to Game m+1. Hence, we have the conclusion that Game m is indistinguishable from Game m + 1.
The formal proof is as follows.
Proof.
Our aim is to prove that, for any PPT adversary A, the simulated experiment Exp
Technically, we denote the challenge ciphertext and its related plaintext by C * and M * , and write
and denote the final output of A in Game i by output A,i . Without loss of generality, we assume that A always makes q decryption queries, where q = poly(k).
Game −2: Game −2 is the real experiment
Exp
Game −1: Game −1 is the same as Game −2, except that, in the challenge ciphertext generation, the experiment aborts (with A outputting 1) if there exist
. By a union bound, we have that
Game 0: Game 0 is the same as Game −1, except for the decryption oracle.
* , the experiment aborts (without loss of generality, A outputs 1). Since H is a collision-resistant hash function, we have that
for a suitable PPT algorithm A .
In the remainder, we will use a hybrid argument to finish this proof. From Game 0 to Game L, we will replace the challenge ciphertext C * and its related randomness R * with those generated by simulator S step by step. Specifically, for any 0 ≤ m ≤ L, Game m is identical to Game 0, except that, for any i ≤ m, X * i , K * i and their related randomness are all generated by simulator S . Note that, in Game L, the whole challenge ciphertext C * and the whole randomness R * are both generated by simulator S .
Looking ahead, if we can prove that, for any 0 ≤ m ≤ L − 1, Game m and Game m + 1 are indistinguishable, we will have that Game 0 and Game L are indistinguishable. So Game −2, which is Exp With the lemma, we have that 
Game m.4: Game m.4 is the same as Game m.3, except for the generation of K * m+1 in the challenge ciphertext. In this game, the way of computing K * m+1 is modified again.
If
The strongness 
By a union bound, we have that 
, since Game 0 excludes hash collisions. The decryption query C j is not equal to the challenge ciphertext, so T j = T * . Note that, in this case,
. What the adversary knows is given by 
with probability at most Adv
Therefore, we have that
Lemma 3 follows from a union bound.
Remark 4.
Recall that Game m.4 is missing in the original security proof of the FHKW scheme (Fehr et al., 2010) . Without the employment of algorithm ReSamp in Game m.4, we will have K * m+1 = SecEvl(hsk, X * m+1 , t * ). Then the simulator has to present the adversary the randomness corresponding to K * m+1 . Consequently, the adversary is able to recover K * m+1 = SecEvl(hsk, X * m+1 , t * ) from the randomness. But security against substitution attacks of the L-cross-authentication code assumes that the adversary knows nothing about K * m+1 except for (K * =m+1 , T * ). That is why the original security proof (Fehr et al., 2010) fails, and why ours can go through.
Conclusion
We provided a security analysis of the FHKW scheme (Fehr et al., 2010) , and showed that the original simulator constructed by Fehr et al. (2010) is not sufficient to prove NC-CCA security. We provided a refined version of the FHKW scheme for a single bit and proved its NC-CCA security. Our scheme does not involve any cross-authentication code, avoiding the security problem that annoys the FHKW scheme. To fix the security proof of the FHKW scheme, we introduced the notion of strong cross-authentication code, applied it to the FHKW scheme, and proved that the new version of the FHKW scheme is NC-CCA secure for multi-bit plaintexts.
Open questions:
(i) The failure of the simulator proposed by Fehr et al. (2010) does not rule out the existence of other simulators working properly for the NC-CCA security proof of the FHKW scheme. Therefore, it is still open whether the original version of the FHKW scheme is NC-CCA secure or not.
(ii) Even if the original version of the FHKW scheme is not NC-CCA secure, it might still possess SIM-SO-CCA security. Hence, another question is whether it is SIM-SO-CCA secure or not.
(iii) It can be interesting to construct an NC-CCA secure PKE encrypting multiple bits from an NC-CCA secure PKE encrypting single bits. This question in the relaxed setting of IND-CCA2 has been answered by Myers and Shelat (2009) . But the selective opening scenario is much more complicated, and we believe that the problem is much harder.
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Appendix A When algorithm XAuth is probabilistic
In Section 4.3, we claimed that, if algorithm XAuth of XAC in the FHKW scheme is probabilistic, with the aforementioned simulator S in Section 4, the FHKW scheme cannot be proved NC-CCA secure for any positive integer L. Now we show the reason.
Firstly, a slight modification to XAuth is needed.
Because XAuth is probabilistic, there exists an inner random number R [L] . Now we make a modification to XAuth: we require that XAuth be efficiently "explainable", which means that there is an efficient algorithm Explain XAuth such that R XAuth ← Explain XAuth ((K 1 , . . . , K L ), T ). For simplicity, we still use the original notation S and XAuth after this modification.
Secondly, with the above modification, consider our main conclusion of this appendix. As the proof of Theorem 1, our aim is to construct an adversary A = (A 1 , A 2 ) to distinguish the two experiments Exp Because XAuth is probabilistic, it is very easy for A to get a T = T with the above method. As a result, with an overwhelming probability, A 2 will receive M = (0, · · · , 0) as the decryption result of C in Exp 
